The Supreme Court of Canada has said they can be charged and convicted.
http://www.canlii.org/en/sk/skpc/do...html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQAIdHJlc3Bhc3MAAAAAAQ
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FACTS
[7] An Agreed Statement of Facts admitted that:
a) The three accused are all treaty Indians, being members of the Flying Dust First Nation, which is a part of Treaty No.6;
b) On the evening of December 26, 2001, the accuseds were hunting elk near Dorintosh, Saskatchewan. They did not have licenses, permits, or any lawful authorization to hunt elk;
c) They were hunting out of season;
d) They were hunting at night, between 8:00 and 9:00 PM, on privately owned land which was leased to Randy Jones and Pam Jones, which land is within the area covered by Treaty No.6;
e) Randy Jones and Pam Jones are ranchers. They have a residence and farmyard on this property. The hunting took place on a portion of the property which is a fenced stubble field, was less than one half mile from the Jones’ house and buildings, and the field had been used to pasture cattle in the fall of 2001;
f) Willis G. Merasty and Howard J. Bear shot at the elk with firearms from the ditch adjacent to Provincial Highway #4 which runs adjacent to the Jones property. Willis G. Merasty and Howard J. Bear shot at a herd of elk, killing two elk, with firearms from the ditch adjacent to Provincial Highway #4 which runs adjacent to the Jones property.
g) The accused entered the Jones property with their vehicle, retrieved the two elk and butchered them on the Jones property, left the hides and gut piles on the property, and loaded the elk meat into their vehicle and left;
h) The accused divided up the elk meat between the three of them and each took some of the meat to their homes. They admit to being in possession of the elk meat within the meaning of Section 33 of The Wildlife Act, 1998;
i) None of the Defendants had permission from the landowners or the lessee, Randy Jones and Pam Jones, to hunt elk on the Jones property on December 26, 2001.
[8] Additional evidence led at the trial established that the land on which the hunting took place was not posted.
ANALYSIS
[9] As the Agreed Statement of Facts proves all the essential elements in this case, the only outstanding issue is whether the accused have an aboriginal right to hunt which makes them not guilty of the charges.
[10] In R. v. Badger 1996 CanLII 236 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Natural Resources Transfer Act, 1930, imposes is a geographical limitation on the aboriginal right to hunt guaranteed by treaty. The right to hunt for food on any land to which there is a right of access for the purpose of hunting is limited where the visible use of such land is for a purpose incompatible with hunting. The Supreme Court concluded that hunting on scrub land with stubble, where there were no fences and an occupied house was nearby, was not permissible because it was land that was visibly being used and therefore there was no right of access to these lands nor any treaty right to hunt for food on the lands. Similarly, there was no right to hunt on a snow covered field which was unfenced, with run down barns nearby, and on which land a crop had been harvested in the fall. On the other hand, hunting on uncleared muskeg, on unfenced land where there were no building near the sight of the kill, was permissible because it was not land that was being put to any visible use which was incompatible with the aboriginal right to hunt for food. While this case dealt with Treaty 8, I conclude that it applies equally to Treaty 6.
[11] In subsequent cases in Saskatchewan, the application of the test set out in Badger was considered:
a) In R. v. Peeace (2000) 2000 SKCA 16 (CanLII), 189 Sask. R. 117 (C.A.), the court held there was no right to hunt on an unfenced summer fallow field which would be seeded the next spring because it was land being used for an agricultural purpose;
b) In R. v. Ahenakew (2000) 2000 SKQB 425 (CanLII), 197 Sask. R. 195 (Q.B.), the court held there was no right to hunt on pasture land leased from the Crown, where it was surrounded by a fence and gate and the kill site was located in close proximity (one and one half miles) from the lessee’s residence, and the yard site was visible from the road on which the aboriginal hunters were travelling, even though there were no cattle in the pasture, but the accused knew that the land was used as pasture land and that there were homes in the area.
[12] Applying the Badger test to this case, I find that the Jones property is property that was visibly being used for a purpose incompatible with a right to hunt. Use of the land as pasture was for an agriculture purpose. The hunting took place on a portion of the property which is a fenced stubble field and where a residence and farmyard and building are located less than one half mile away. These facts clearly establish a visible, incompatible land use.
[13] The accused argue that there is an implied right of access as was found in R. v. Lachance reflex, [1997] S. J. No. 820, and R. v. Bird [1983] 4 C.N.R. 77. In those cases the right to access was based on the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Mousseau 1980 CanLII 194 (SCC), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 89, in which was held that a right to access is created by custom, usage, or consent of the owner or occupier. In Lachance, the right to access, and the right to hunt, was created by the fact that the accused had hunted in the particular area for many years. In Bird, the implied consent was based on the fact the owner was aware that the land was, on occasion, used for hunting and expressed no objection to this.
[14] I do not find any implied consent, or right to access, in the circumstances of this case. No evidence was led to establish a long-standing practice of hunting on this land. No evidence was led that the owner or occupier was aware of hunting on the land and took no objection to it. The circumstances of this case are distinguishable from those in Lachance and Bird given the lack of this evidence.
[15] The accused further argued that there is an implied right of access because the subject land in this case was not posted, and that Section 41 of the Wildlife Act, 1998, makes it an offence to hunt on posted land except with the consent of the owner or occupant.
[16] Section 41(6) of the Act confirms that the absence of signs alone does not imply consent to entry on the land nor imply a right of access for the purpose of hunting.
[17] In R. v. Horse, 1988 CanLII 91 (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 187, the Supreme Court of Canada held in the interpretation of a similarly worded section which was the predecessor of section 41, that the right of access was restricted and is subject to the common law of trespassing. The court held that the statute reinforces the restriction to enter on private lands and makes it abundantly clear that the failure to post the land is not sufficient to imply consent to enter on the land or to imply a right of access. The court further held that hunters, whether they be treaty Indians or otherwise, enter private property with no greater rights than other trespassers. The absence of signs prohibiting hunting is not, without more, implied consent for a hunter to enter on the land for the purpose of hunting. There must be evidence of permission, either expressed or implied, before a right of access to hunt on private land exists. There is no right of access in the absence of such permission or consent from the owner or occupier. The right to hunt food is unrestricted on land to which treaty Indians have a right of access as described in Mousseau.
[18] The accused here did not have consent, either expressed or implied, to enter on the land and therefore did not have a right of access for the purpose of hunting for food on the Jones property.
[19] I therefore find each of the accused guilty of all charges.
Dated this 13th day of December 2004.
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