Bartok,
Agreed that platform would be better than the C9, but even then, how much would it be worth it to still have another platform?
That would be more like the F1 C1/C2 platform, but the main difference being that the stock C7 is already capable of automatic fire.
The counter-argument is "Being 'capable' does not mean it's really designed for sustained automatic fire" is right, but the whole point is that we've found that sustained automatic fire isn't really that effective at killing the enemy compared to precise aimed single shots. Auto sounds good in theory when we think of defensive positions like the opening scene of Saving Private Ryan, but that's such a low probability of happening that it's not worth it for a rifleman/machinegunner to carry them. If we ever have a dedicated static position, then by all means load it up with as many MGs as possible.
My stance is that there's really only two times a soldier would use automatic to good effect:
- Clearing something from extremely close range, be it a trench or a room if the battlespace allows it.
- As a last ditch "Holy-sh!t I'm surrounded and they're not taking me alive" effort.
Either one of those cases would be within the automatic capability of the C7 without destroying it.
For everyone else, sorry for the mini thread jack.
Your comparison of the Fightlight MCR to the FNC1/C2 i situation is ill-founded, as the C2 was essentially incapable of precision automatic fire and added nothing to the capability of the rifle section to provide sustained, accurate automatic fire (it had a fixed barrel and was magazine -fed),
Your counter-argument is based on previous generations of LMG, where the weapon shares little to no parts or handling commonality with the service rifle, is much heavier, is a relatively innacurate " area weapon", is fully-automatic only, and is essentially the current C9/M249 situation. That outdated paradigm does not apply to the Figbtlight MCR, which Is an "assault machinegun" capable of single-shots or a volume of precise and sustained automatic fire that the service rifle/carbine simply cannot provide. For examples of where this capability would be beneficial, one need look no further than the German ambush and 9-hour firefight in Afghanistan during which the G36 rifle was found to be overheatingto the point of accuracy degradation. Or a similar, prolonged battle where the French lost multiple troops. Or any number of Canadian engagements wherein a lightweight, enhhanced-capability "autmatic rifle" with a Quick-Change Heavy Barrel and sustained ammo supply (eg. belt-fed) capable of accurate and prolonged automatic fire would have been immensely beneficial.
Your two scenarios wherein automatic fire is deemed essential are far too limited. They apply to a rifleman equipped with a service rifle, but do not take into account the need for accurate and effective automatic fire to suppress enemy positions so that other friendly elements can manoeuvre to attack. This is an essential foundation of the "fire and manoeuvre" concept enabling offensive action. It requires effective fire to be placed upon identified and/or suspected enemy positions. History has demonstrated that the best weapon for this purpose is a machine gun. Replace the old, stand-alone LMG with a hybrid "Assault MG" capable of providing equally precise fire as the service rifle, but In sustained MG fashion (eg belt-feed with QCB), and you have the best of both worlds. A weapon that can be carried and employed like a rifle, weighs only marginally more, fires equalĺy weĺl from magazines or belts, is equally accurate and reliable, etc. Such a weapon would be indispensable for offensive operations.
The same argument can be made for defensive and transitional operations. There are numerous defensive scenarios where a rifle-hybrid LMG would be quite literally indispensable. It doesn't take a lot of imagination to picture situations where the employment of "enhanced rifles" with LMG attributes but rifle-like accuracy would be advantageous. Human wave attacks and Vehicle-Borne Suicide IEDs are still a reality in the current operating environment. The fluid nature of transitional operations only means that friendly forces would further benefit from what I am talking about. A hybrid that brings LMG capabilities to a rifle-sized package is precisely what the USMC is attempting to field with a homogmenous fleet of the M27 Infantry Automatic Rifle. What I am proposing is similar, but retains true belt (Or magazine) feed and QCB capabiliies - which in my view remain essential at the Sectiton/Squad level.
You are looking at the need for LMG-capability from a rifleman's perspective. You need to consider what It is that allows the rifleman to manoeuvre under fire, and that is covering fire. History definitively tells us that such covering fire is best delivered by LMGs, ideally with rifle-like accuracy. What I am proposing is a compromise which reduces the LMG to a rifle-compatible upper receiver which retains rifle-like accuracy while adding belt or magazine feed and a QCB system to selected rifles enabling prolonged/sustained fire.
Your argument that everything requiring small arms can be accomplished with rifles is fallacious and would not withstand even the most superficial criticism based on historical, small-unit combat outcomes. Even the USMC admits that their M27 is not the end all and be all. LMGs remain an essential force-multiplier within the modern battlespace. What is ideally required is a hybrid which blends the capabilities of an LMG into a rifle-like package. The Fightlight MCR is the system currently closest to that ideal mix of capability and package size/weight/complexity. Just saying...
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