Volley sighs & shooting
- Thread starter fat tony
- Start date
The point of the exercise would be for the commander to adjust fire, so there would be cease fires for sight adjustments until fire was on target. Then in your own time, go on.
When I was in the British Army (but not WWI) falling plates were big iron plates that fell over when hit. Maybe 18" square. Falling plate competitions were popular.
I'm guessing, but could the term "combined sights" refer to some riflemen using the long range (dial) peep sights and others in the company using the sliding leaf sights?
Dial sights are usually found on machine guns or even early versions of some light machine gun such as the BREN.
A dial implies a 360 degree full circle of adjustment, rather than a quadrant - or less - as found on the long range [volley] sight.
tac
A dial implies a 360 degree full circle of adjustment, rather than a quadrant - or less - as found on the long range [volley] sight.
tac
They did that most nights, not just during an attack. I've read quite a lot of the war diaries of the Canadian Machine Gun Corp (Grampa was a machine gunner during WW1), and most guns would be instructed to let of a few thousand rounds of indirect fire into a particular sector just about every night.
a use i have read about long ago was to enable a rifle unit to cover an area without much ammo expended. if you fire a volley at a crossroads you want to deny the enemy, it becomes impassable until you stop, and it only takes a volley a minute with even half your men to do it.
This does justify the "absurdly" long range settings on the firearms of the day, it doesn't add much to the cost, but does give you the theoretical ability for long range fire.
"Musketry, (.303 and .22 cartridges) : elementary training, visual training, judging distance, fire discipline, range practices, field practices":
Section 11. — Need for Collective Fire.
1. (i) Only exceptional targets and very favourable atmospheric
conditions will justify soldiers in opening individual
fire at distances beyond about 600 yards. Collective fire is
necessary to give reasonable assurance of fire effect beyond
about 600 yards up to about 1,400 yards, which is usually
the limit of effective rifle fire. Beyond 1,400 yards, the fire
of even large and well-controlled Units of infantry has seldom
much effect upon the decision of the struggle for superiority
of fire.
(ii) Collective concentrated fire is also used to form a
cone of fire for observation of fire, when results can be
noted by the dust raised by the strike of bullets on the
ground or by the effect of fire upon the enemy. It must be
clearly impressed upon the mind of the soldier at this stage
that, however skilful individual men may he as marksmen,
the greatest effect is produced by their fire only when it is
efficiently directed and controlled.
2, (i) The soldier must also be made to understand
clearly why effect cannot be obtained from individual fire
in battle beyond close range, and why collective fire is
necessary for fire effect at all ranges beyond close range.
The answer to this question may be stated simply and very
broadly as follows: In effect, for various reasons, the individual
marksman cannot as a rule see his target clearly or
at all with the naked eye beyond close range on service,
and he can neither aim at it with accuracy nor be certain
of its exact range. Moreover, the effect of inaccurate firing,
whether due to excitement, fatigue, or other causes,
increases with distance.
(ii) Clearly, therefore, the soldier cannot obtain reason-
able assurance of fire effect by individual fire beyond close
range. Accordingly, fire-unit commanders equipped with
field-glasses discern and indicate targets to him. They give
him ranges after they have been ascertained by the use of
range-finding instruments, or by observation of fire, when
possible, and they direct the fire of a number of individual
soldiers in a volume which, whether distributed or concentrated,
is sufficient to compensate for individual errors,
and so obtain fire effect as described in Sees. 12 and 13,
and in Chapter VL
3. The principal reasons which militate against the assurance
of fire effect, by individual fire, beyond close range
may be summed up as follows: The effects of fatigue and
excitement on the firer ; the effects of atmosphere, heat,
and light; errors due to imperfections in the rifle and
ammunition; uncertainty in estimating longer ranges; the
difficulty of discerning and aiming at small, moving, and
indistinct or invisible targets; and the steepness of the
angle of descent of the bullet, which becomes rapidly accentuated,
and so decreases dangerous space as range
increases.
4. The soldier must be made to realize that the results
of errors of marksmanship due to these various causes
increase in extent as the range increases, and that they reach
their maximum at longer ranges ; that is to say, targets
become smaller and more difficult to see and to aim at, their
range becomes harder to estimate, and the accuracy of fire
for other reasons stated becomes less as the range increases.
Therefore, the effect of individual fire decreases as the range
increases. It is easily possible for instructors in the course
of lectures on this point to make it sufficiently clear to
men that, under service conditions at longer ranges, effect
must be obtained from collective fire rather than from
individual fire, for aU the above reasons. In some degree
this important principle of the science of modem warfare
can be demonstrated by firing at service targets on full
distance and also on miniature ranges [see p. 215, para, (ii),
and p. 221, para, (iii)j.
Section 12. — Dispersion of Individual and
Collective Fire.
1. Shot Groups. — Owing to errors on the part of the firer,
and also to imperfections in the rifle and ammunition, it
is found that a series of shots, even when fired by an individual
under perfect conditions at a large, stationary, dis-
tinct target at a known and close range, do not all strike
the point aimed at, but they form a group of shot-marks
about this point, the density of which varies mainly with
the skill of the firer.
2. Cone of Fire (Fig. 6) . — It is evident that the trajectories
of these shots will not coincide, but will together form a
figure termed "the cone of fire." It is also clear that,
when aim is well directed, the bullets of a cone of nre
should always strike an object so long as the shot group
formed by it is either smaller or of the same size as the
object aimed at. But when the shot group is spread over
a larger surface than the size of the object, shots must
necessarily miss the mark in proportion as the size of the
grouping exceeds that of the object aimed at.
3. Dispersion of Individual Fire. — It is clear, therefore,
that the dispersion of individual fire explained in para, i
will of itself, apart from the various factors mentioned m
Sec. II, militate against the assurance of fire effect hj
individual fire at longer ranges, because the dispersion of
fire will become greater as the target decreases in . size,
owing to distance, and the shot group wiU consequently
be spread over a much larger surface than that of a long-
range service target, even if stationary and visible to the
naked eye.
4. Dispersion of Collective Fire. — When a body of soldiers
fires with the same elevation at the same object, the dis-
persion of shots is accentuated by the varying skill and
eyeesight of the men, with the result that the cone formed
will be of larger dimensions than in the case of individual
fire. The dimensions of the cone of fire wiU again be
further increased if the firers are from any cause, such as
fatigue or excitement, unsteady; if the rifles are in bad
condition or the target indistinctly seen — factors which
are all incidental to firing under the conditions of active
service.
@ GrantR: This would give what I would think to be very effective "overkill" coverage. I would not want to be on the receiving end, though I'm almost certain 300/400 riflemen could not keep this rate of fire up for anywhere near long duration's before the ammo mules couldn't keep up. If the gunnery battery personnel being fired upon had sufficient overhead coverage nearby, (they wouldn't be able to retreat clear of the beaten path without taking wild casualties) They would no doubt be able to weather the brief onslaught and return to their guns...then it's time for the 400 to receive shell fire with extreme prejudice.
Thanks Grant, the process is much clearer in my mind.
Thanks Grant, the process is much clearer in my mind.
@ GrantR: This would give what I would think to be very effective "overkill" coverage. I would not want to be on the receiving end, though I'm almost certain 300/400 riflemen could not keep this rate of fire up for anywhere near long duration's before the ammo mules couldn't keep up. If the gunnery battery personnel being fired upon had sufficient overhead coverage nearby, (they wouldn't be able to retreat clear of the beaten path without taking wild casualties) They would no doubt be able to weather the brief onslaught and return to their guns...then it's time for the 400 to receive shell fire with extreme prejudice.
Thanks Grant, the process is much clearer in my mind.
after the first "burst" the riflemen only need to fire often enough to keep the enemy pinned.
hmmm, we have to remember that there is most likely not a line of sight (South Africa aside). I would think they would apply fire until satisfied the guns were removed or gun crew casualties are such that the guns are no longer a threat. Then advance on the position.
fat tony
CGN Ultra frequent flyer
Aaahhhh .... Maxim guns and Magazine Lees .... a most effective combination!
Love this image ....
The gunner looks like he is thinking: "wankers!" NCO material for sure. He - has - got - the - machine gun - course - and - they - have not. The riflemen will be sent on wheelwright & semaphore courses (poor sods).
A hearty thank you to all of you who posted really relevant and fascinating historical documentation. Fun!
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