Picture of the day
- Thread starter jwhc
- Start date
Yes, the L1A1 was the issue rifle at the time. But the SAS had M16. If I recall them correctly (there were two of them at the presentation) the M16 was just being introduced as the SAS rifle. They originally had, or were supposed to get the A2 model with round burst, but the model they took south was the regular full auto version, which he thought was a better choice.
These two gentlemen were in uniform, and were introduced by the British military attache. They were the real deal.
Google got me this:
During the night of 14 May, two Westland Sea King HC4 helicopters of 846 Naval Air Squadron, part of the Commando Helicopter Force, departed with 45 members of D Squadron on board. The delivery point was 6 km (3.7 mi) from the airstrip on Pebble Island. Mountain Troop was tasked with the destruction of the Argentine aircraft, while the remaining personnel acted as a protection force, securing approaches to the airstrip, and forming an operational reserve.
The raiding party unloaded over 100 L16 81mm Mortar bombs, explosive charges, and Rocket 66mm HEAT L1A1 Light Anti-tank Weapons to carry into the engagement zone from the helicopters, with each man in the raiding party carrying at least two mortar bombs. For small arms, M-16 rifles were used, some with underslung M203 grenade launchers. Approach navigation was conducted by a member of the Boat Troop who had carried out the reconnaissance.
As the raiding party approached the target they spotted an Argentine sentry but were not seen, allowing them to enter the target and lay charges on seven of the aircraft. Once all the aircraft had been prepared the raiding team opened fire on the aircraft with small arms and L1A1 rockets. All of the aircraft were damaged, with some having their undercarriages shot away. Following this cue Glamorgan began shelling the Argentine positions on the airfield using high-explosive rounds, hitting the ammunition dump and fuel stores.
The defending force did not engage until the entire raiding party had re-grouped and were preparing to move out. One British soldier was hit and wounded while the raiding party returned fire using small arms and M203 grenade launchers, resulting in the death of the Argentine Commanding Officer (according to British assessments) and the suppression of any defensive effort.
The Argentine version states that their marines remained in shelters during the Glamorgan shelling, so they were unable to face the SAS in combat. The British wounded were the result of shrapnel from exploding charges settled by the Argentines under the airstrip in order to deny its use to the enemy. The blasts were triggered in the belief that the operation was a full-scale assault to take over the air base.
The wounded man was hauled back to the recovery site with the raiding party reaching the aircraft by the required time for transportation back to Hermes before daybreak. The decision was made to proceed with exfiltration rather than returning to attack the defending force.
These two gentlemen were in uniform, and were introduced by the British military attache. They were the real deal.
Google got me this:
During the night of 14 May, two Westland Sea King HC4 helicopters of 846 Naval Air Squadron, part of the Commando Helicopter Force, departed with 45 members of D Squadron on board. The delivery point was 6 km (3.7 mi) from the airstrip on Pebble Island. Mountain Troop was tasked with the destruction of the Argentine aircraft, while the remaining personnel acted as a protection force, securing approaches to the airstrip, and forming an operational reserve.
The raiding party unloaded over 100 L16 81mm Mortar bombs, explosive charges, and Rocket 66mm HEAT L1A1 Light Anti-tank Weapons to carry into the engagement zone from the helicopters, with each man in the raiding party carrying at least two mortar bombs. For small arms, M-16 rifles were used, some with underslung M203 grenade launchers. Approach navigation was conducted by a member of the Boat Troop who had carried out the reconnaissance.
As the raiding party approached the target they spotted an Argentine sentry but were not seen, allowing them to enter the target and lay charges on seven of the aircraft. Once all the aircraft had been prepared the raiding team opened fire on the aircraft with small arms and L1A1 rockets. All of the aircraft were damaged, with some having their undercarriages shot away. Following this cue Glamorgan began shelling the Argentine positions on the airfield using high-explosive rounds, hitting the ammunition dump and fuel stores.
The defending force did not engage until the entire raiding party had re-grouped and were preparing to move out. One British soldier was hit and wounded while the raiding party returned fire using small arms and M203 grenade launchers, resulting in the death of the Argentine Commanding Officer (according to British assessments) and the suppression of any defensive effort.
The Argentine version states that their marines remained in shelters during the Glamorgan shelling, so they were unable to face the SAS in combat. The British wounded were the result of shrapnel from exploding charges settled by the Argentines under the airstrip in order to deny its use to the enemy. The blasts were triggered in the belief that the operation was a full-scale assault to take over the air base.
The wounded man was hauled back to the recovery site with the raiding party reaching the aircraft by the required time for transportation back to Hermes before daybreak. The decision was made to proceed with exfiltration rather than returning to attack the defending force.
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I don't understand your point. He was familiar with the FN, having probably carried one before, and now having been shot at with them. Why wouldn't he have an opinion? And are you surprised he thought the FN was better? Many soldiers hold that belief today.
The briefing was soon after the war. It was an attempt to bring others up to speed in terms of what happened, how it was done, what worked and what did not. It was one of the most interesting briefings I ever had.
He was issued a M16. It is common knowledge that the SAS used (and may still) the M16 (and the current variant).
I don't recall if he had any reservations about the M16 before the fight. I recall him saying that they were supposed to get the 3 round burst version, but got the FA version, instead. He said this was good.
We were asking about the M16 rifle and in his opinion the FN and the bigger bullet was more effective. I gathered that at one point they were fighting in rocky terrain and rock chips were a hazzard. I got the impression that most of his fighting was at night.
The second briefing was by a para (in 1983 or '84, I think). He had taken quite a few 35mm slide pictures. Most were taken at ground level (only because he could not get any lower). I recall him commenting on how loud a quad 20 is when it is aimed at you.
^ What I have been told, the rifle (M16) was well received it was just felt the 5.56 rd to be underperforming at the longer ranges and higher cross winds that a 7.62 NATO round handled better. I have also yet to meet a Brit that calls his rifle a "FN", always L1.
fat tony
CGN Ultra frequent flyer
I think the fact that there has been a lack of any kind of spigot mortar like device in Western nations for decades (such as Canada) might be due to them being too cheap and cost effective, therefore not enough kickbacks for government contractors. The spigot launchers for the C1A1 rifles were taken out of service some time in the 1970s from what I understand.
There were so many choices for advanced rifle grenades in the 1970s, yet the concept was abandoned.
Maybe a case where the weapon didn't fit in with the 'warm and fuzzy' blue beret image?
Japan recently had the option of adopting an M203 (licensed copy) for their Self Defence Force but concluded that a modern rifle grenade was superior, and went with them.
Senegalese constables with anti riot weapons. Maybe an FN shotgun with an unknown cup discharger. The constable in behind with the red beret is carrying something definitely unknown to me. Maybe an M203 copy with a locally manufactured stand - alone stock assembly?
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I called it the FN. I don't recall what he called it.
In the late 1960's, our NATO Brigade was attached to the 2nd Div BAOR. I got involved with the Rhine Army Parachute Association and became a free fall instructor.
One of my first students was a young Brit soldier who had served in Borneo and Sarawak where he saw combat.
He told me about being issued an "Armalite" rifle. I was aware of the type and kept referring to it as the M16. He kept saying "NO, it said Armalite" on the receiver." He thought the world of it and wanted it to become standard issue for the whole army.
One of my first students was a young Brit soldier who had served in Borneo and Sarawak where he saw combat.
He told me about being issued an "Armalite" rifle. I was aware of the type and kept referring to it as the M16. He kept saying "NO, it said Armalite" on the receiver." He thought the world of it and wanted it to become standard issue for the whole army.
fingers284
CGN Ultra frequent flyer
- Location
- Alberta Cowboy Ranges
My suspicion about the early griping that surrounds almost every new rifle issued to any given army is about familiarity.
Every platform has its problems. But over time, institutional knowledge is built up around a given rifle, so that even the new troops are taught quickly and effectively how to get the most from a given rifle. And that breeds confidence.
When a new rifle is introduced, it will invariably have teething problems. But as those are worked out, and as the institutional knowledge is built up around a given rifle/weapon system, they seem to garner more and more respect. It's a pattern that looks to have been repeated over and over again in many armies around the world.
Every platform has its problems. But over time, institutional knowledge is built up around a given rifle, so that even the new troops are taught quickly and effectively how to get the most from a given rifle. And that breeds confidence.
When a new rifle is introduced, it will invariably have teething problems. But as those are worked out, and as the institutional knowledge is built up around a given rifle/weapon system, they seem to garner more and more respect. It's a pattern that looks to have been repeated over and over again in many armies around the world.
A couple years ago, Guns & Ammo reprinted several articles they ran on the M16 rifle back in the 60's (they were in an issue of Book of the AR-15). Back then, there were 3 major problems identified in '65 and '66 with the M16, only one of which could be traced to the rifle's design.
The first problem was the propellant (powder). IIRC it was Winchester Olin who couldn't make enough of the low-fouling powder the M16 was supposed to use, so the US military substituted standard ball powder that was used in the 7.62 NATO round (so the production would be enough to supply the soldiers). Standard ball powder caused much more fouling than the other powder, and we all know what fouling does to reliability.
The second problem was training. There was very little training (something along 10 hours) on the M16 before the soldier was sent to Vietnam with it. Not only did they not know how to properly clean and maintain it, they weren't even issued cleaning gearbecause the rifle was promoted as "low-maintenance" (and with the original powder maybe it was) and didn't NEED cleaning (how anyone could swallow that is beyond me).
The third problem, and the only real design fault, was that the chamber and barrel were not chromed to resist the effects of fouling and corrosion. Once that was done, reliability jumped way up.
To its credit, the US military recognized these problems (after quite a bit of bad press re : casualties) and set about fixing them. The rifles' barrels and chambers were chromed, training time was more than doubled (to something around 26 hrs before the soldier went to 'Nam), cleaning kits were issued, and the powder was changed to the original spec.
There was a survey done of combat soldiers in Vietnam in late '68 about the M16 rifle. IIRC of some 2,600 soldiers surveyed, only 35 or so wanted to see the M16 replaced. 32 of those 35 or so wanted to have it replaced with a shorter version - the CAR-15 (the ancestor of the M4/C8 carbines).
Once the initial teething problems with the M16 were fixed, the soldiers came to love its light weight, speedy round, and ability to carry lots of ammo for the same weight. As an aside, the article from '65 said that an M16 with 120 rounds of ammo weighed the same as an unloaded M14-right around 9 pounds. That's a rifle and 6 loaded magazines (the US used 20 round mags at the time) for the weight of the previous rifle unloaded. As any soldier knows, ounces equal pounds, and pounds equals pain!!!
fat tony
CGN Ultra frequent flyer
In the last pic the trooper is holding the munitions for the launcher. It was a type of flame explosive which had white phosphorus in the liquid. They could be hand thrown as well. I had heard that these devices were sometimes buried in pits after they went past their best before date. Sounds like a typical sketchy 1940s way of getting rid of dangerous devices incorporating nasty compounds. Hopefully someone kept records of where these things were buried!
"Northover Projector"
"No. 76 Grenade"
http://civildefence-suffolk.webeden.co.uk/#/northover-projector/4546523526
Sounds like fun!
This is supposed to be a BSA Light Infantry Pattern Lewis Gun:
Britain received some stripped down Lewis Guns in .30/06 from the USA. According to the website above, some of them were fitted with spare buttstocks and sights which would only make the 47 round drum practical to use with them.
RN sailor with Lewis Gun, about WWII era?:
New Zealand training Lewis Gun, WWII era:
"Northover Projector"
"No. 76 Grenade"
http://civildefence-suffolk.webeden.co.uk/#/northover-projector/4546523526
Sounds like fun!
This is supposed to be a BSA Light Infantry Pattern Lewis Gun:
Britain received some stripped down Lewis Guns in .30/06 from the USA. According to the website above, some of them were fitted with spare buttstocks and sights which would only make the 47 round drum practical to use with them.
RN sailor with Lewis Gun, about WWII era?:
New Zealand training Lewis Gun, WWII era:
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Dark Alley Dan
CGN Ultra frequent flyer
- Location
- Darkest Edmonton
Very cool stuff, MarkCNP - any idea what the critter on the bottom is? Looks like some sort of plumbing error on motorcycle wheels...
A couple years ago, Guns & Ammo reprinted several articles they ran on the M16 rifle back in the 60's (they were in an issue of Book of the AR-15). Back then, there were 3 major problems identified in '65 and '66 with the M16, only one of which could be traced to the rifle's design.
The first problem was the propellant (powder). IIRC it was Winchester Olin who couldn't make enough of the low-fouling powder the M16 was supposed to use, so the US military substituted standard ball powder that was used in the 7.62 NATO round (so the production would be enough to supply the soldiers). Standard ball powder caused much more fouling than the other powder, and we all know what fouling does to reliability.
The second problem was training. There was very little training (something along 10 hours) on the M16 before the soldier was sent to Vietnam with it. Not only did they not know how to properly clean and maintain it, they weren't even issued cleaning gear
The third problem, and the only real design fault, was that the chamber and barrel were not chromed to resist the effects of fouling and corrosion. Once that was done, reliability jumped way up.
To its credit, the US military recognized these problems (after quite a bit of bad press re : casualties) and set about fixing them. The rifles' barrels and chambers were chromed, training time was more than doubled (to something around 26 hrs before the soldier went to 'Nam), cleaning kits were issued, and the powder was changed to the original spec.
There was a survey done of combat soldiers in Vietnam in late '68 about the M16 rifle. IIRC of some 2,600 soldiers surveyed, only 35 or so wanted to see the M16 replaced. 32 of those 35 or so wanted to have it replaced with a shorter version - the CAR-15 (the ancestor of the M4/C8 carbines).
Once the initial teething problems with the M16 were fixed, the soldiers came to love its light weight, speedy round, and ability to carry lots of ammo for the same weight. As an aside, the article from '65 said that an M16 with 120 rounds of ammo weighed the same as an unloaded M14-right around 9 pounds. That's a rifle and 6 loaded magazines (the US used 20 round mags at the time) for the weight of the previous rifle unloaded. As any soldier knows, ounces equal pounds, and pounds equals pain!!!
Was a little more complicated than that ... here is a worthwhile link to get some more insight into the powder issue ... while the link is accurate ... it doesnt even begin to reflect the mass of material that was gathered for the Congressional report on the issue of "jamming" M16's etc .. http://www.thegunzone.com/556prop.html
Sure they did
and yes .. thats a very good reason to pay attention to the signs around ranges that say No Trespassing etc .. as a kid I had the dubious pleasure of attending a few DND schools ... everyone of them had a glass display case inside the front door with a large selection of various munitions and numerous warnings to "do not touch!!!" if you find one of these.and then there is this: http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2...0_possible_locations_of_unexploded_bombs.html
