Using an MP40 is one thing, but driving around in captured German vehicles would make me awfully tense. I've been "shot" more times than I can count by tankers behind me while doing a recce screen. And that's in peacetime, on exercise, in a big cuss off obviously Canadian armoured vehicle, with tanks equipped with modern optics. In WW2? No freaking way, thank you very much.
Policy of carrying enemy small arms in Canadian Army,
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Using an MP40 is one thing, but driving around in captured German vehicles would make me awfully tense. I've been "shot" more times than I can count by tankers behind me while doing a recce screen. And that's in peacetime, on exercise, in a big cuss off obviously Canadian armoured vehicle, with tanks equipped with modern optics. In WW2? No freaking way, thank you very much.
You need to read a little more carefully my friend. the writer specified 1974, I believe that the Korean war was a little over by then. LOL
Scott
Catch up, covered that quite a few posts ago.
And no, jesus, again and always.... no. The Korean war WASN'T over by 1974. It STILL isn't over. There's an armistice in place, but no peace treaty has ever been signed.
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/as...th-south-summit-latest-news-a8324976.html?amp
www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/world/asia/north-south-korea-baekdusan-paekdu-kim-moon.amp.html
Man, jesus, if you want to be a smart ass, again... at least be right.
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Sorry, didn't get a chance to go thru the whole thing until just now. Quite right.
Scott
Kayser Sose
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StG44 and crayyyzee boots!
nowarningshot
CGN Ultra frequent flyer
I liked the photo of the Stuuge, with a US marking.
Stens and MP40s have the same rate of fire, both about 550 rpm. They sound identical. If anything, some variants of the Sten are faster than MP40s, but by a negligible amount.
On the other hand I wouldn't necessarily want to be the guy off to the flank ripping away with a captured MG42... thst would probably draw some unwanted friendly attention.
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fat tony
CGN Ultra frequent flyer
Scott Casey realized he needed a hg in Bosnia. He reached out to his chain of supply - a drunken Croat officer in his billet & walked out with a slightly used CZ 75. I am not sure but he traded something for it. Seems somewhat strange he & his fellow soldiers were not provided with proper combat pistols - in an all out warzone driving around in an Iltis on patrol, only arm was the C7 for the N - Coy. contingent.You could say 'yes but' well I guess everyone over there without a decent handgun felt the lack keenly. I know one guy who brought his own handgun to Operation Salon.
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maple_leaf_eh
CGN Ultra frequent flyer
Salon was the response to the Mohawks at Akwesasne, Kahnawake, and Oka. And just to keep the name alive, Op Ginger was the FLQ crisis response.
maple_leaf_eh
CGN Ultra frequent flyer
Defence Administrative Orders and Directive (DAOD) 3002-5, Use of Firearms, Ammunitions and Explosives
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-3000/3002-5.page
Lots of discussion of use of foreign firearms and ammunition. Not necessarily tactical information, but the sort of instruction that keeps people from doing something less than intelligent in between times.
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-3000/3002-5.page
Lots of discussion of use of foreign firearms and ammunition. Not necessarily tactical information, but the sort of instruction that keeps people from doing something less than intelligent in between times.
Brutus
CGN Ultra frequent flyer
I seen this same picture years ago in a coffee table history book. Yes you are right. This gentleman was identified as a resistance fighter with STG 44 and what appears to be Wehrmacht webbing. Two loaded magazines stuffed in his belt the live ammo plainly visible in the magazine platform. Cheers
fat tony
CGN Ultra frequent flyer
The place in Ontario was mainly quiet from what he told me. Canada would have been under enormous pressure if Op. Salon escalated according to those in the know.
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Dealing with the Oka crisis was an ordeal to say the least. The military and police could certainly have handled whatever came up, politicians not so much.
It was interesting to watch things lurch into action in NDHQ where we were also involved with planning our response Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait that summer.
Lots of what-iffing, contingency planning and trying to out-guess the politicians as usual. I could probably write a thin book about our political response to the Gulf War, which dictated our somewhat ornamental military response.
It was interesting to watch things lurch into action in NDHQ where we were also involved with planning our response Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait that summer.Lots of what-iffing, contingency planning and trying to out-guess the politicians as usual. I could probably write a thin book about our political response to the Gulf War, which dictated our somewhat ornamental military response.
maple_leaf_eh
CGN Ultra frequent flyer
Dealing with the Oka crisis was an ordeal to say the least. The military and police could certainly have handled whatever came up, politicians not so much.
Lots of what-iffing, contingency planning and trying to out-guess the politicians as usual. I could probably write a thin book about our political response to the Gulf War, which dictated our somewhat ornamental military response.
The book has been written. It is Operation Broadsword, and was the staff's response to 'what could Canada do in the Gulf War'?.
Why didn't the Cdn Army participate in the Gulf war?
1. Cheese dique political leadership by Brian Mulroney who wasn't prepared to deal with the possibility of large scale casualties and to mobilize public opinion on what participating in a war meant.
2. Too much gold plating by Army planners who wanted a school solution, whereas the French Army went on light scales and performed a useful role (they had political will behind them).
3. No pools of replacement equipment or a supply of trained reinforcements, although 2 brigades in Canada could have been tapped for this. The other brigade was tied up with the Oka operation. Nobody really knew how useless the Iraqis were, so responsible planners had to assume a certain level of combat losses and replacements.
4. There was a lot of talk about deployment and sustainment shortfalls; lack of war stocks, airlift and sealift. We were actually in pretty good shape for ammo and had a huge volume to bring back from CFE when we closed out over the next 2 years. We were integrated with the US for air/sealift planning and execution and could have merged our flow from Europe and our sustainment from Canada as well. I did an exchange tour in the US and was intimately aware of how it could work. This wasn't a real show-stopper like some claimed it to be; it was another excuse.
The worst thing about our non-participation was that it showed that our land commitment in NATO was a hollow farce and a political gesture at best. There we were claiming to be ready to go with the Soviets, then we backed away from the raggedy-a$$ Iraqis. it was demoralizing to say the least
As it was we took the "safe" course of action with the Navy bobbing around out of harm's way and the air force stooging around until the dying moments of the war when they did put in some strikes with the CF18s. I don't know if we could take the "safe" option in the next war, and obviously we didn't in Afghanistan, but that was a different threat in a different situation.
1. Cheese dique political leadership by Brian Mulroney who wasn't prepared to deal with the possibility of large scale casualties and to mobilize public opinion on what participating in a war meant.
2. Too much gold plating by Army planners who wanted a school solution, whereas the French Army went on light scales and performed a useful role (they had political will behind them).
3. No pools of replacement equipment or a supply of trained reinforcements, although 2 brigades in Canada could have been tapped for this. The other brigade was tied up with the Oka operation. Nobody really knew how useless the Iraqis were, so responsible planners had to assume a certain level of combat losses and replacements.
4. There was a lot of talk about deployment and sustainment shortfalls; lack of war stocks, airlift and sealift. We were actually in pretty good shape for ammo and had a huge volume to bring back from CFE when we closed out over the next 2 years. We were integrated with the US for air/sealift planning and execution and could have merged our flow from Europe and our sustainment from Canada as well. I did an exchange tour in the US and was intimately aware of how it could work. This wasn't a real show-stopper like some claimed it to be; it was another excuse.
The worst thing about our non-participation was that it showed that our land commitment in NATO was a hollow farce and a political gesture at best. There we were claiming to be ready to go with the Soviets, then we backed away from the raggedy-a$$ Iraqis. it was demoralizing to say the least
As it was we took the "safe" course of action with the Navy bobbing around out of harm's way and the air force stooging around until the dying moments of the war when they did put in some strikes with the CF18s. I don't know if we could take the "safe" option in the next war, and obviously we didn't in Afghanistan, but that was a different threat in a different situation.
