The First Cdn Army attack from south of Caen to Falaise and beyond was a real bu99er's muddle in many ways. It was full of things that we were later taught to do and not to do, and it was very much a learning ordeal for the troops involved.
Some of the problems included an innovative, but top down planned and directed, attack which denied flexibility to those on the ground. It was replete with problems incl 2 fresh and inexperienced formations, 4th Cdn and 1st Polish Armd Divs, who went through a very steep and costly learning curve, lack of command, control and communications, lack of int on the enemy in a rapidly changing situation, hasty/poor battle procedure which denied lower levels time for recce, planning and co-ordination, troops outrunning their artillery support, poor terrain appreciation, ineffectiveness of heavy bomber and tactical air support resulting in numerous blue on blue losses, poor co-ordination with flanking/friendly formations, and interrupted logistics support for the tank units.
Some of the more glaring shortcomings included a rigid timetable for Operation Totalize, the initial attack, which saw the troops break through the German defensive crust and then sit and wait several hours for a programmed strategic bomb strike instead of exploiting success (Meyer, the German commander likened it to stopping to feed the horses in the middle of a cavalry charge), excessive caution by green troops in the Cdn and Polish Armd Divs who were the designated exploitation forces, lack of continuous artillery support, poor command and control and situational awareness by senior commanders ( Kitching, who commanded 4th Armd Div, actually found Booth, who commanded the 4th Armd Bde, drunk in his command tank), and failure to recognize the River Laize as an unfordable tank obstacle in Operation Tractable, the second deliberate attack to get to Falaise. Booth was KIA and replaced by the CO of the CGG who attempted to run 4 Armd Bde while suffering from a broken ankle. The Germans continued to react and inflict heavy losses during the operation to the point where they were eventually depleted or withdrawn from the Falaise pocket.
This was a real trail of tears for the inexperienced armoured regiments in the 4th Cdn Armd Div ( BCR, CGG, GGFG and SAR) who sustained very heavy tank and personnel losses and had to be continuously reconstituted as the operation progressed(at one point the BCR was virtually wiped out after making a navigational error which put them on an isolated position well removed from their objective, which was then overrun by German armour).
We won out in the end as a result of the persistent efforts of the troops, allied air and artillery support (even though poorly co-ordinated at times), and the fact that the Germans were depleted and trying to execute a withdrawal. I knew and served with number of people who participated in the Falaise operation, incl a tank driver in the SAR and troop leaders in both the SAR and CGG and my uncle who was a RCEME tank fitter involved in repairing tanks to keep them in action.
I'd recommend the following books which provide some good insights into the Cdn involvement in the Falaise Gap operations; "No Holding Back", by Brian Reid, which focuses on the initial attack, Operation Totalize, and "The Armoured Campaign in Normandy", by Stephen Napier. There are other references, including the Cdn official history and various regimental histories, but I find these 2 books somewhat more objective and analytical, and maybe less self-serving. I'd pick them as references for officer training.
