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x that by 5 and you'll know how many good guy's they killed.

But what if the tank only had a crew of four? Or three? Or what if the tank commander and loader got out with only minor injuries? It could also indicate that they have knocked down a few planes too.

What I am trying to say is that the kill markings on a vehicle in no way indicate how many people were killed, just the amount of equipment they they gun crew has eliminated.

And it is probable safe to assume that the crew notched most of that up while on the eastern front.
 
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Nembo & Folgore, wasn't that their two para divisions?
 
But what if the tank only had a crew of four? Or three? Or what if the tank commander and loader got out with only minor injuries? It could also indicate that they have knocked down a few planes too.

What I am trying to say is that the kill markings on a vehicle in no way indicate how many people were killed, just the amount of equipment they they gun crew has eliminated.

And it is probable safe to assume that the crew notched most of that up while on the eastern front.

There's a good fifty rings there. The type of "kill" it was is represented by a little profile drawn into the round you see on each ring at the mid line of the barrel.

How many "good guys" did that gun crew kill? A few hundred you can be sure.
 
Wittman had 88 on his Tiger when they were pulled out, called to Berlin and decorated. They then went West and he added another 50 plus; his beast had 138 kill rings (1x100, 3x10, 8x1) when he was killed and they had another few that hadn't been painted on yet.

Being that the 88 FLAK pieces were used for everything but were just so VERY good at Tanks and trucks, likely some of these are for trucks, others Tanks.

MOST Tanks hit by an 88 would brew up instantly: by the time that 22-pound chunk of steel knocks its way through 2 to 4 inches of sold steel, it's HOT. The effects INSIDE a Tank would be somewhat like a 4-inch shotgun firing scrap-metal at close range....... in WITH you.

Knew a guy once who was with an 88 battery in North Africa. He said that he wouldn't get into a Tank for all the money in the world.

Guess he knew what he was talking about.
 
They only count vehicle kills. The amount of men killed inside each vehicle is irrelevant.

But what if the tank only had a crew of four? Or three? Or what if the tank commander and loader got out with only minor injuries? It could also indicate that they have knocked down a few planes too.

What I am trying to say is that the kill markings on a vehicle in no way indicate how many people were killed, just the amount of equipment they they gun crew has eliminated.

And it is probable safe to assume that the crew notched most of that up while on the eastern front.
 
Wittman had 88 on his Tiger when they were pulled out, called to Berlin and decorated. They then went West and he added another 50 plus; his beast had 138 kill rings (1x100, 3x10, 8x1) when he was killed and they had another few that hadn't been painted on yet.

Being that the 88 FLAK pieces were used for everything but were just so VERY good at Tanks and trucks, likely some of these are for trucks, others Tanks.

MOST Tanks hit by an 88 would brew up instantly: by the time that 22-pound chunk of steel knocks its way through 2 to 4 inches of sold steel, it's HOT. The effects INSIDE a Tank would be somewhat like a 4-inch shotgun firing scrap-metal at close range....... in WITH you.

Knew a guy once who was with an 88 battery in North Africa. He said that he wouldn't get into a Tank for all the money in the world.

Guess he knew what he was talking about.
Apart from the destructive power of the 88mm and other anti-tank guns versus the protective abilities of armour, one of the main reasons why allied tanks fared so poorly against German anti-tank defenses in N. Africa was the failure to properly integrate infantry and artillery with armour in an all-arms team. The favorite German tactic was to lure British tanks against an anti-tank gun screen in well selected positions and then kill the tanks before they could get close enough to the guns to engage them with HE rounds. The Brits would willingly oblige by charging unsupported tanks against the guns which often could have been destroyed or suppressed with indirect fire from supporting artillery or perhaps taken out by maneuver with infantry using artillery in support. The 88 and other wheeled anti-tank guns were quite unprotected and very vulnerable to artillery or infantry. The US Army also learned this lesson the hard way in N. Africa and both Brit and US forces continued to re-learn this in Italy and NW Europe. Cdn armoured formations were also bloodied in the same way with futile tank-led attacks against prepared anti-tank defences. The Germans mastered combined arms maneuver warfare, incl close air support, early on and did very well because of this. The allies enjoyed a huge advantage in artillery during WW2, but tended to use artillery in isolation in massive preparatory bombardments with a false expectation that tanks and infantry could then just roll in and police up the survivors.

The last really vivid lesson of the vulnerability of the tank operating in isolation against anti-tank defences came in the 1973 Yom Kippur War when the Israelis attacked Egyptian troops who has successfully crossed the Suez canal and quickly dug in and established an anti-tank screen using Sagger missiles. Following their spectacular successes in the 1967 Sinai war the Israelis had concluded that the tank was pre-eminent and put all their money on armour to the neglect of infantry and artillery. This led to very costly tank attacks against dug in infantry with the very effective Sagger missile, rather than using continuous artillery fire support and infantry to eliminate or suppress these defences so that tanks could proceed.

We continue to teach the doctrine of combined arms maneuver warfare where armour and infantry fight as a team with continuous artillery support. This exploits the strengths of each of the 3 fighting arms in the best way.
 
Apart from the destructive power of the 88mm and other anti-tank guns versus the protective abilities of armour, one of the main reasons why allied tanks fared so poorly against German anti-tank defenses in N. Africa was the failure to properly integrate infantry and artillery with armour in an all-arms team. The favorite German tactic was to lure British tanks against an anti-tank gun screen in well selected positions and then kill the tanks before they could get close enough to the guns to engage them with HE rounds. The Brits would willingly oblige by charging unsupported tanks against the guns which often could have been destroyed or suppressed with indirect fire from supporting artillery or perhaps taken out by maneuver with infantry using artillery in support. The 88 and other wheeled anti-tank guns were quite unprotected and very vulnerable to artillery or infantry. The US Army also learned this lesson the hard way in N. Africa and both Brit and US forces continued to re-learn this in Italy and NW Europe. Cdn armoured formations were also bloodied in the same way with futile tank-led attacks against prepared anti-tank defences. The Germans mastered combined arms maneuver warfare, incl close air support, early on and did very well because of this. The allies enjoyed a huge advantage in artillery during WW2, but tended to use artillery in isolation in massive preparatory bombardments with a false expectation that tanks and infantry could then just roll in and police up the survivors.

The last really vivid lesson of the vulnerability of the tank operating in isolation against anti-tank defences came in the 1973 Yom Kippur War when the Israelis attacked Egyptian troops who has successfully crossed the Suez canal and quickly dug in and established an anti-tank screen using Sagger missiles. Following their spectacular successes in the 1967 Sinai war the Israelis had concluded that the tank was pre-eminent and put all their money on armour to the neglect of infantry and artillery. This led to very costly tank attacks against dug in infantry with the very effective Sagger missile, rather than using continuous artillery fire support and infantry to eliminate or suppress these defences so that tanks could proceed.

We continue to teach the doctrine of combined arms maneuver warfare where armour and infantry fight as a team with continuous artillery support. This exploits the strengths of each of the 3 fighting arms in the best way.

early in the war french and british tanks far out classed german ones, the char B1 bis and matilda 2 were invulnerable to all german guns but the 88 until the arrival of the 75mm l/43 of the panzer 4G. a british tanker once told a captured german AA gunner that he thought it was quite unfair that they used AA guns (like the 88) against tanks. the german told him that it was unfair to use tanks that couldnt be knocked out otherwise

the britsh even made a very similar gun (the 90 mm AA) that would have made most german armour seem weak and feeble if they thought to point it at tanks, but they didnt.
 
I'll meet you half way.

After the Nomandy landings the British/Canadian and other commonwealth countries crancked their 40mm Bofors into the down position. They proceded to barrage the Germans like this so much, that by Operation Plunder they were having trouble keeping guns operational due to worn out parts.
 
early in the war french and british tanks far out classed german ones, the char B1 bis and matilda 2 were invulnerable to all german guns but the 88 until the arrival of the 75mm l/43 of the panzer 4G. a british tanker once told a captured german AA gunner that he thought it was quite unfair that they used AA guns (like the 88) against tanks. the german told him that it was unfair to use tanks that couldnt be knocked out otherwise

the britsh even made a very similar gun (the 90 mm AA) that would have made most german armour seem weak and feeble if they thought to point it at tanks, but they didnt.

The 50mm PAK was the replacment for the 37mm that the Germans took to sarcastically calling "the Army's door knocker". Yes, the Matildas put the SS Brigade Das Reich into a tizzy at Arras in 1940. Even Rommel got excited and reported that he was being attacked by armoured divisions, not a battalion or two of the Royal Tank Regiment. It's been said that Hitler and the OKH were more anxious about an Allied counter-attack after Arras, and so were more cautious than they needed to be.

I should add the while the Char-B had a short barrelled 75mm like earliest Pz.IVs, it was in the hull not the turret with very little traverse. The French made the commander of the tank also the loader or gunner, I forget which, so that he was too busy doing that to command properly (Russians made the same mistake. The Pz.IV had a three man turret and the Pz. III probably did too. The Matilda also had a two man turret, the 2 Pounder gun had no HE shells, not even a canister round, which meant it had only MGs to deal with infantry and anti-tank guns. It was cluster fruck all round. Of course the German high command was almost as resistant to tanks, but the "Panzer generals" had Hitler on their side and he pushed their program through over the opposition of the OKH.

The British had the 3.7" AA gun, a bit more powerful than the 88 even and it was tried against tanks and bunkers in the desert with deadly effect, but rigid minds insisted it was an AA gun and shouldn't be used for other purposes! The officer who was pushing the idea happened to be transferred out of the theatre and "business as usual" continued until the 57mm 6 Pounder arrived. Inter-branch politics and inertia basically. Vickers built a 75mm multipurpose gun in the 30s that would have been ideal, but of course rigid little minds don't like guns that don't fit into neat little organizational charts, and so they didn't buy any.

Purple has summed up the other problem: lack of proper inter-arms integration. Again, orthodoxy, apathy and inertia; they never even reached the level of integration that was achieved in 1918, at least not until 1944/45. No wonder Churchill used to rage against the Army leadership in cabinet meetings!
 
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Good day fellow Gunnutz :) New day new picture :)

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Cheers
Joe

I would not care to owe these gentlemen money, or anger them, or give them the impression that I was someone they didn't care for.

They look scruffy enough to be Australians (I have a deep and abiding respect for the Australians and their innate sense of equality and distate for any sort of "classist" bahaviour) but there's something about 'em screams "Merrill's Marauders". Were Aussies involved with that lot?

Alternately, this is a picture taken in Kentucky in 1949. Somewhere nearby there are several pigs, a body or two, and a pretty nice still. And Ezekiel there, the feller with the nice hat, got hisself a fair to middlin' car-been from the last Revenooer made the mistake of comin' up the holler without so much as a howd'ydoo...
 
Brits if I remember correctly somewhere in SE Asia possibly Burma. The fellow with the carbine is Joanne Lumley's dad iirc. I have the pic at home in a book somewhere. Relying on my memory which can be somewhat faulty
 
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