Picture of the day
- Thread starter jwhc
- Start date
I don't know, bet he saw it coming at him...and couldn't react fast enough.
Breastplate, belongs to 23 years old Antoine Fraveau, Napoleon's cuirassier. Cannonball wins.
June 1815 Waterloo, Napoleon's last stand.
Nothing but a flesh wound.
StrelokM38
CGN Regular
That peaked my interest. Found this fascinating overview of the situation around that cuirass.
Question:
What role did Cuirassiers and other heavy cavalry play on the battlefield in the Franco-Prussian war 1870-1871? How were they used in the face of the higher rate of fire of weapons of the period?
Reply (By Joseph Scott)
In theory, they were supposed to be used just as they had always been: by shock action, using the awe of their onset, their swords and the weight of their mounts to defeat lighter cavalry, and to ride down infantry or artillery by attacking flanks or riding though holes in the line made by artillery. In both France and the German states, the cavalry were the most anachronistic of arms, and neither group had fully admitted the march of progress. The heavies were the worst offenders, because while lighter cavalry, especially German, had simply focused more on their scouting roles, this had never been the domain of heavy cavalry. Their entire role was the knee-to-knee charge.
There was little way to adapt their tactics to the technology. To, for example, disperse into looser formations would remove the power of their impact. All they could do was to try and use the cover of terrain and smoke to mask themselves from fire as they advanced, which, as will be seen below, they did with some skill. Even so, they needed an opening, a moment when the enemy line was vulnerable to them. As a result, they mostly stood around in reserve waiting for their moment of glory, which, when it came, was usually their last.
Thus, at the Battle of Wörth/Reichshoffen, the Curiassier brigade of General Michel, comprising the 8th and 9th Curiassier Regiments, was ordered to cover the French withdrawal. Up until this moment, they had been sheltering in woods near Eberback-Seltz, where they would not be target for German fire, but as a result, they had little idea of the battlefield situation. Whether by luck or skilful handling, they caught Prussian infantry as they were advancing across the hills between the Albrechtshäuserhof and Morsbronn, and rode them down, allowing French infantry to counterattack and seize the hills. However, it was a costly attack, and worse was to follow.
General Michel’s initial charge was quite successful, but not without loss.
MacMahon, elated by the initial success, then ordered Michel to charge the flank of the Prussian XI Corps at Morsbronn. However, now Michel’s lack of knowledge of the field came into play: as his brigade advanced over the seemingly flat ground, they found themselves confronted by hedges, fences and trellised vineyards that broke up their formations and slowed their advance, as meanwhile, they came under fire from XI Corps artillery. Officers did their best to reform their lines, largely successfully, but at the cost of more time under fire. As they finally came close to Prussian lines, Prussian infantry added to the toll with their needleguns. Nonetheless, with great determination some curiassiers actually fought their way into Morsbronn, but here, trapped in narrow streets lines with hasty barricades, and fired on from upper story windows, they were all shot down.
The last charge of Michel’s brigade, into the town and surrounding woods.
Blocked by barricades and hemmed in on narrow streets where they could not manoeuvre, the curiassiers were shot down helplessly by Prussian troops firing from second-story windows.
Pictured above, one Prussian captain ordered his men to cease firing at the trapped, defenceless cavalry, because "it was just too ghastly". The last curassier in the scene above survived, wounded and captured by the Prussians. He is pictured below. Only 22 of his comrades from the 9th made it back to French lines.
Paul de Villiers, Sous-Lieutenant of the 9th Cuirassiers in 1870, pictured in 1881.
MacMahon, increasingly desperate as the Prussians closed their trap, now flung General Bonnemain's entire reserve heavy cavalry division at them, consisting of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Cuirassiers, in the hope of breaking out or at least forestalling the Prussian advance, but the results were much the same. Nearly 1,100 French Curiassiers fell out of around 2400 present, some 45% of their strength, and MacMahon was defeated.
In remembrance of their charge, the term "Spirit of Reichshoffen" entered the French military lexicon as a way of describing a willingness to do one’s duty no matter the cost.
These gentlemen are curiassier veterans who survived the charges at Reichshoffen, still alive in 1917.
The curiass would stop a .75 calibre musket ball of the Napoleonic era, but it was no match for the Dreyse and Chassepot rifles of 1870s. This one belonged to Lt Colonel Archambault de Beaune, 2nd in command of the 9th Curiassiers during Michel’s charge.
Lt Colonel Archambault de Beaune
At Mars-la-Tour, the French Curiassiers of the Guard attempted to do the same as at Wörth/Reichshoffen, trying to stem the tide of the Prussian infantry advance, but Prussian infantry, firing independently rather than by volleys, shot down 230 men and 244 horses at 200m, some 40% of their strength, and the remnants of the Guard Curiassier fled the field.
Prussian heavy cavalry made their one great showing here, and it fit the same pattern as the French at Reichshoffen. Ordered to silence the guns of Canrobert’s 6th Army, positioned along the old Roman road, Major-General Friedrich Wilhelm Adalbart von Bredow led his heavy cavalry brigade forward, which despite the title, was actually a mix of heavies and mediums, being made of the 7th Curiassiers, 16th Uhlans (lancers), and 13th Dragons, the latter having been detached earlier, so not present for the charge. The Prussian cavalry skilfully used the depression north of Vionville and the smoke that drifted over the field from the blackpowder weapons to mask their advance, only coming into view of the French guns at 1000m. This was not enough time for the gunners to put down adequate fire to stop them, and they overran both French gun lines and several battalions of supporting infantry. Two French cavalry brigades attempted to charge them in the flank, but nearby French infantry, panicked by von Bredow sweeping away their comrades, shot down every cavalryman they could see indiscriminately, disrupting their own cavalry’s attack, and von Bredow’s troops fought their way out and back to Prussian lines. It was a perfect attack, accomplishing all it’s objectives, except for the cost: only 420 of the original 800 made it back to Prussian lines, 47.5% losses. It would be immortalised as “von Bredow’s Death Ride.”
von Bredow’s cavalry successfully overran both of Canrobert’s gun lines, accomplishing their objective.
Sweeping onwards, von Bredow’s brigade routed several supporting infantry battalions.
The costly successes of French heavies at Wörth/Reichshoffen and Prussians at Mars-la-Tour, despite both forces sustaining something like 45-50% losses*, convinced each cavalry corps that the old ways were still viable. After all, von Bredow had accomplished his mission perfectly, while Michel’s initial charge was a complete success too. That his second met with disaster was attributed, not completely unreasonably, to failure to reconnoitre the ground, and to making the mistake of charging into a town and woods. MacMahon was seen to have misused his cavalry, rather than for them to have failed in their role. As for the failure of Bonnemain's attacks, and those of the Curiassiers of the Guard, it had been well-established even in Napoleonic times that a charge required correct timing. To assault steady infantry had never been a viable tactic. The only difference that was seen to older times was a higher rate of losses, which was true in the infantry as well. That was simply seen as the cost of doing business, so to speak, in 1870.
*To give a sense of scale for these losses, the famous charge of the British Light Brigade at Balaklava in 1854, often heralded as the epitome of a disastrously costly cavalry attack, only sustained 41% losses, compared to the 45–50% typical in 1870. It is clear that French and German cavalry in 1870 both possessed extremely high morale and discipline.
When, in the acrimonious tactical debates that followed in the Imperial German Army in succeeding decades, the usefulness and feasibility of the cavalry charge was questioned by reform-minded officers, the Old Guard (von Bredow still alive amongst them) would proudly point to the Death Ride as proof of what they could still do!
While German cuirassiers were forced to carry lances and carbines along with all other German cavalry in the years following, both French and German heavies still looked eagerly forward to the chance to relive the glory of 1870 in 1914!
Question:
What role did Cuirassiers and other heavy cavalry play on the battlefield in the Franco-Prussian war 1870-1871? How were they used in the face of the higher rate of fire of weapons of the period?
Reply (By Joseph Scott)
In theory, they were supposed to be used just as they had always been: by shock action, using the awe of their onset, their swords and the weight of their mounts to defeat lighter cavalry, and to ride down infantry or artillery by attacking flanks or riding though holes in the line made by artillery. In both France and the German states, the cavalry were the most anachronistic of arms, and neither group had fully admitted the march of progress. The heavies were the worst offenders, because while lighter cavalry, especially German, had simply focused more on their scouting roles, this had never been the domain of heavy cavalry. Their entire role was the knee-to-knee charge.
There was little way to adapt their tactics to the technology. To, for example, disperse into looser formations would remove the power of their impact. All they could do was to try and use the cover of terrain and smoke to mask themselves from fire as they advanced, which, as will be seen below, they did with some skill. Even so, they needed an opening, a moment when the enemy line was vulnerable to them. As a result, they mostly stood around in reserve waiting for their moment of glory, which, when it came, was usually their last.
Thus, at the Battle of Wörth/Reichshoffen, the Curiassier brigade of General Michel, comprising the 8th and 9th Curiassier Regiments, was ordered to cover the French withdrawal. Up until this moment, they had been sheltering in woods near Eberback-Seltz, where they would not be target for German fire, but as a result, they had little idea of the battlefield situation. Whether by luck or skilful handling, they caught Prussian infantry as they were advancing across the hills between the Albrechtshäuserhof and Morsbronn, and rode them down, allowing French infantry to counterattack and seize the hills. However, it was a costly attack, and worse was to follow.
General Michel’s initial charge was quite successful, but not without loss.
MacMahon, elated by the initial success, then ordered Michel to charge the flank of the Prussian XI Corps at Morsbronn. However, now Michel’s lack of knowledge of the field came into play: as his brigade advanced over the seemingly flat ground, they found themselves confronted by hedges, fences and trellised vineyards that broke up their formations and slowed their advance, as meanwhile, they came under fire from XI Corps artillery. Officers did their best to reform their lines, largely successfully, but at the cost of more time under fire. As they finally came close to Prussian lines, Prussian infantry added to the toll with their needleguns. Nonetheless, with great determination some curiassiers actually fought their way into Morsbronn, but here, trapped in narrow streets lines with hasty barricades, and fired on from upper story windows, they were all shot down.
The last charge of Michel’s brigade, into the town and surrounding woods.
Blocked by barricades and hemmed in on narrow streets where they could not manoeuvre, the curiassiers were shot down helplessly by Prussian troops firing from second-story windows.
Pictured above, one Prussian captain ordered his men to cease firing at the trapped, defenceless cavalry, because "it was just too ghastly". The last curassier in the scene above survived, wounded and captured by the Prussians. He is pictured below. Only 22 of his comrades from the 9th made it back to French lines.
Paul de Villiers, Sous-Lieutenant of the 9th Cuirassiers in 1870, pictured in 1881.
MacMahon, increasingly desperate as the Prussians closed their trap, now flung General Bonnemain's entire reserve heavy cavalry division at them, consisting of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Cuirassiers, in the hope of breaking out or at least forestalling the Prussian advance, but the results were much the same. Nearly 1,100 French Curiassiers fell out of around 2400 present, some 45% of their strength, and MacMahon was defeated.
In remembrance of their charge, the term "Spirit of Reichshoffen" entered the French military lexicon as a way of describing a willingness to do one’s duty no matter the cost.
These gentlemen are curiassier veterans who survived the charges at Reichshoffen, still alive in 1917.
The curiass would stop a .75 calibre musket ball of the Napoleonic era, but it was no match for the Dreyse and Chassepot rifles of 1870s. This one belonged to Lt Colonel Archambault de Beaune, 2nd in command of the 9th Curiassiers during Michel’s charge.
Lt Colonel Archambault de Beaune
At Mars-la-Tour, the French Curiassiers of the Guard attempted to do the same as at Wörth/Reichshoffen, trying to stem the tide of the Prussian infantry advance, but Prussian infantry, firing independently rather than by volleys, shot down 230 men and 244 horses at 200m, some 40% of their strength, and the remnants of the Guard Curiassier fled the field.
Prussian heavy cavalry made their one great showing here, and it fit the same pattern as the French at Reichshoffen. Ordered to silence the guns of Canrobert’s 6th Army, positioned along the old Roman road, Major-General Friedrich Wilhelm Adalbart von Bredow led his heavy cavalry brigade forward, which despite the title, was actually a mix of heavies and mediums, being made of the 7th Curiassiers, 16th Uhlans (lancers), and 13th Dragons, the latter having been detached earlier, so not present for the charge. The Prussian cavalry skilfully used the depression north of Vionville and the smoke that drifted over the field from the blackpowder weapons to mask their advance, only coming into view of the French guns at 1000m. This was not enough time for the gunners to put down adequate fire to stop them, and they overran both French gun lines and several battalions of supporting infantry. Two French cavalry brigades attempted to charge them in the flank, but nearby French infantry, panicked by von Bredow sweeping away their comrades, shot down every cavalryman they could see indiscriminately, disrupting their own cavalry’s attack, and von Bredow’s troops fought their way out and back to Prussian lines. It was a perfect attack, accomplishing all it’s objectives, except for the cost: only 420 of the original 800 made it back to Prussian lines, 47.5% losses. It would be immortalised as “von Bredow’s Death Ride.”
von Bredow’s cavalry successfully overran both of Canrobert’s gun lines, accomplishing their objective.
Sweeping onwards, von Bredow’s brigade routed several supporting infantry battalions.
The costly successes of French heavies at Wörth/Reichshoffen and Prussians at Mars-la-Tour, despite both forces sustaining something like 45-50% losses*, convinced each cavalry corps that the old ways were still viable. After all, von Bredow had accomplished his mission perfectly, while Michel’s initial charge was a complete success too. That his second met with disaster was attributed, not completely unreasonably, to failure to reconnoitre the ground, and to making the mistake of charging into a town and woods. MacMahon was seen to have misused his cavalry, rather than for them to have failed in their role. As for the failure of Bonnemain's attacks, and those of the Curiassiers of the Guard, it had been well-established even in Napoleonic times that a charge required correct timing. To assault steady infantry had never been a viable tactic. The only difference that was seen to older times was a higher rate of losses, which was true in the infantry as well. That was simply seen as the cost of doing business, so to speak, in 1870.
*To give a sense of scale for these losses, the famous charge of the British Light Brigade at Balaklava in 1854, often heralded as the epitome of a disastrously costly cavalry attack, only sustained 41% losses, compared to the 45–50% typical in 1870. It is clear that French and German cavalry in 1870 both possessed extremely high morale and discipline.
When, in the acrimonious tactical debates that followed in the Imperial German Army in succeeding decades, the usefulness and feasibility of the cavalry charge was questioned by reform-minded officers, the Old Guard (von Bredow still alive amongst them) would proudly point to the Death Ride as proof of what they could still do!
While German cuirassiers were forced to carry lances and carbines along with all other German cavalry in the years following, both French and German heavies still looked eagerly forward to the chance to relive the glory of 1870 in 1914!
Kampfhamster
CGN frequent flyer
- Location
- Switzerland
Now thats an interesting piece of history. Thank you for that. Another example of "but we have always done it that way"
Britain,France,Italy and Spain have dedicated cuirassier ceremonial units.
I think Chile,Argentina and possibly some other Latin American countries also have parade cuirassiers,I'm not sure if those are dedicated units or just uniforms issued to guards.
I think Chile,Argentina and possibly some other Latin American countries also have parade cuirassiers,I'm not sure if those are dedicated units or just uniforms issued to guards.
Translated from Portuguese:
The night is warm, starry and tropical: sometimes a noise is felt, immediately with ears pricked, the animal stands guard, staring at the place where the noise came from.
There are times when you stare at me, without understanding me, but a signal from me is enough for our dialogue to continue.
I know what I want from him and he is prepared to do what I want.
We completed our surveillance mission.
It is the human reasoning to see through the penetrating, sniffing, infallible optics of the dog.
Obedient, aggressive, quick to attack, the Dogs of War are well the complement of man in this war.
- How many ambushes did he detect?
- How many cunning intentions did he fail?
- How many lives didn't you save?
(text by Pcabo Paraquedista Santos in Jornal Boina Verde 1970)
(Photo in Angola, by Carlos Nereu)
Pedro Castanheira.
