As has been pointed out, the entire problem is discussed at length in "Hatcher's Notebook". Hatcher himself was the man who tracked down the problem when the initial 2 rifles blew up and he also worked on the improved double heat-treatment for the high-numbered Springfields.
Hatcher was for about 15 years the "Director of Accidents" for the US military. Every single rifle which had a major failure in the US Army passed across his desk. There is a chapter in his 'Notebook' in which EVERY rifle accident over a 15-year period is detailed, most incidents detailed quite fully.
There can be no doubt that the problem actually existed and still does exist. Can there possibly be any other reason that the US Army specified that a MILLION rifles should not be rebuilt when it was their time, but rather cannibalised for parts and the receivers destroyed?
(Funny, but most Americans are willing to dump on the 'weak' Lee-Enfield action.... but I never heard tell of a million SMLEs being ordered destroyed because of weak receivers!)
The actual problem was steel which had been quenched from too high a temperature, giving a receiver which was much too hard, too deep into the metal. A cure of sorts was developed, but it proved difficult, finicky and unreliable. Likely this was in part due to the fact that testing would show how hard the SURFACE of a receiver might be, but it could not show what the steel was like BELOW the surface hardening... and this is where the problem lay. The original heat-treatment was erratic and actually depended upon whether the receiver was heat-treated on a sunny day or an overcast day. Because of the impossibility of determining which receivers were made on which days, it was decided to destroy them all. Nevertheless, there are thousands of low-numbered Springfields around which have chugged their way through case after case of ammunition with no problems. There were others which failed after a few dozen rounds.
One thing that is known is that each rifle did, at one point, accept a 'Blue Pill" load of about 70,000 psi (raised to 78,000 because of this problem). Also, there is no doubt but that grease or oil on the ammunition or in the chamber can make a RADICAL difference in thrust on the bolt-face and hence upon the locking-lugs.
Were I in the position of owning a low-numbered Springfield (and I am not, but this is a matter of finance and nothing else), I do not think that I could resist shooting it, had it a decent barrel. But I do rather like having my eyes in my head and I really like having my hands attached, things like that. I think I would be handloading for the thing and staying with MILD loads (under 40,000 psi) and using SLOWER powders (along the lines of 4350). I think that would increase the safety factor tremendously. The original ammunition was loaded with Pyro DG, by today's standards notoriously fast, and this powder was quick enough that the pressure, rather than rising, would JUMP. This SHOCK factor from the very-fast powder also likely had a hand in the destruction of these rifles. Substitute a PUSH for the SHOCK and it is likely that most of them would be safe enough.
But that is strictly MY take on things.
READ HATCHER. He was the man on the spot. He identified the problem. He helped to solve the problem. He investigated every single accident for 15 years. And he wrote it all down! His "Hatcher's Notebook" is the single most valuable compendium of useful knowledge to the gun-nut of any book ever written. I own two books with which I will NOT part: "Hatcher's Notebook" and "The Text Book of Small Arms -1909" TBSA tells me what things were like as designed. Hatcher tells me what goes wrong with them... and why!
Hope this helps.